Donald Trump spent a noteworthy chunk of the transition period provoking controversy—and insulting NATO allies—with his proposals for expanding the U.S. Maybe most prominently, he has repeatedly discussed buying Greenland from Denmark, a stance he robustly reaffirmed on his first day in office, earlier this week.
While American expansion hasn’t been discussed much in recent times, the proposal to buy Greenland makes more sense if one understands the history of the Arctic. Buying the island would aim to counter Russian and Chinese ambitions to dominate a region critical to Washington. And it would only be the latest chapter in a long history of the U.S.—and during its existence, the Soviet Union—purchasing land across the Arctic in moments of heightened tensions.
[time-brightcove not-tgx=”true”]
Today’s renewed interest signals that great powers are once again seeking to control vital sea routes, oceans, islands, and resources at the top of the world. It’s a stark warning of rising tensions and increased competition. Yet, just as his counterparts did in the past, Trump may find that “buying the Arctic” is not as straightforward as he thinks.
In 1865, in the wake of the Civil War, the U.S. began looking to expand its influence on the world stage. This happened at precisely the moment when Russia, having just lost the Crimean War, was seeking to counterbalance British power in the Pacific. This proved to be the perfect recipe for American expansion in the Arctic.
In 1867, Russia sold Alaska to the U.S. for $7.2 million, with the territory soon placed under the control of the U.S. Army. Both countries shared hostility towards Britain, so the sale was a shrewd and calculated deal for both parties. Although it ended Russia’s footprint in North America, it expanded Washington’s access to the Pacific and helped counter British activity in the strategically important and economically prosperous region. This was just the start of America’s foray into the Arctic.
The move was part of President Andrew Johnson’s naked and vast geopolitical ambition. Having successfully purchased Alaska, Johnson’s Secretary of State William Seward floated the prospect of buying the islands of Greenland and Iceland, this time from the Danes. Denmark had been weakened by its defeat during the Second Schleswig War of 1864, and at this moment of Danish weakness, Seward had already discussed the purchase of Danish islands in the Caribbean to establish a naval base.
Negotiations took place, but failed to win Republican support in Congress.
This setback, however, failed to dash American desires to buy the strategic Danish territory. In 1910, the administration of President William Howard Taft again explored the possibility of buying Greenland. The move came at a moment when there was growing interest in Arctic resources, such as minerals for the growing armaments industry, not to mention increased attention on Greenland’s strategic location between the U.S. and Europe. The two sides discussed proposals to purchase the island outright or to swap it for U.S. territory in the Philippines, but with World War I looming, attention soon turned to more pressing matters.
The U.S. was not the only country looking to the Arctic to shore up its interests in this period.
After World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, the newly formed Soviet Union looked to bolster its presence in the Arctic by purchasing mining rights on the archipelago of Svalbard (Spitsbergen to the Russians). With its close proximity to the Russian mainland (400 miles), its abundance of natural resources, and its strategic location at the gateway to the North Atlantic, the set of Islands were critical to Moscow’s economic and defense interests.
With the embers of war still burning, the Soviets sought to buy their stake, not take it by force. In 1927, the Soviets struck when the Dutch company that owned the Barentsberg coal mine on Svalbard found it difficult to sustain its operations due to the harsh and unforgiving Arctic climate. Then, five years later, in 1932, the USSR repeated the process when the Swedish coal mine in Pyramiden was put up for sale. On both occasions, the Soviet Union willfully purchased the sites, providing coal to the northern communities of the USSR and ultimately establishing their much-desired presence on the strategic islands.
As the Soviets foresaw, this region would only grow in importance as World War II emerged on the horizon.
After Germany occupied Norway in 1940 and Adolf Hitler’s troops invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, Svalbard became a key point of military contestation. Arctic Convoys from the U.S. were critical for supplying Soviet forces and they passed by this crucial territory. In an effort to intercept and hamper these missions, the Nazis occupied Svalbard and set up intelligence stations that could gather weather data to help aid in attacks on Allied ships. To safeguard the convoys, Allied forces responded by attacking these stations, which marked the start of the “Weather War,” a battle for control of critical intelligence information that would ultimately spread to Greenland.
This war over weather intelligence helped reignite U.S. interest in Greenland. Germany occupied Denmark, enabling it to receive data from Danish weather stations on the island. Although this access was quickly cut off by the British, it did not stop German ambitions in the region. Greenland was also home to an abundant source of cryolite, a rare earth mineral important for the production of military aircraft in Canada and the U.S. With this in mind, Germany began to increase their naval activity around Greenland while launching multiple covert attempts to establish their own weather stations on the island.
In response—even before the U.S. even officially joined the war—President Franklin D. Roosevelt made the bold decision to extend the U.S. neutrality zone to include Greenland and the Azores. This declaration allowed the U.S. Navy to patrol the western Atlantic, broadcast the location of German ships to the British, and effectively placed the U.S. in an “undeclared war” against the Axis powers. Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, marked the one-year anniversary of the German occupation of Denmark by signing an agreement with the Danish Ambassador to Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, in which the U.S. promised to defend Greenland and build a wide range of military bases and infrastructure on the island.
Kauffman acted without the approval of the occupied Danish government, who attempted to recall him for his actions. Yet, though he became known as the “Good Traitor,” the ambassador understood how strategically vital Greenland was to winning the war, working tirelessly with the Roosevelt government to defeat their common enemy.
It helped that Roosevelt did not envision the agreement as a precursor to buying Greenland. Instead, it affirmed Danish sovereignty — albeit with the significant caveat that the U.S. could maintain its military presence until both sides agreed the dangers to American peace and security had passed. Known as “Article X,” this provision effectively gave the U.S. the right to a military presence in Greenland for as long as was deemed necessary.
It became newly relevant after the war as Cold War tensions between the U.S. and USSR escalated. The U.S. identified the Arctic as a likely route for any Soviet nuclear attack and Denmark became a crucial American ally, as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In 1951, defense concerns prompted the U.S. and Denmark to reaffirm and expand the 1941 agreement permitting the U.S. to maintain military, intelligence, and coastguard operations on Greenland.
That agreement has been periodically reaffirmed over the ensuing 75 years, most recently in 2004, ensuring the U.S. can maintain early warning radar, utilize the two-mile-long airstrip on the island, and harness the port at Pituffick, the northernmost deep-water port in the world.
This history shows that buying territory in the Arctic has been a longstanding practice for geopolitical rivals struggling to gain an upper hand and ensure their own defense. When the domestic politics of both owner and potential buyer align, such sales have been easy. In some cases, when they haven’t, the superior military power invaded and occupied land, as the Germans did during World War II.
But this history presents a problem for President Trump. He seems well on his way to getting domestic support for buying Greenland thanks to his dominance of the GOP and the legitimate security concerns posed by Moscow and Beijing. Yet, unlike in previous cases, the Danes have no interest in accommodating him. A combination of Danish pride and the inclusion of the Indigenous community of Greenland in decision-making, after decades of neglect, make this different from 1867 with Alaska, or even the World War II moves by the U.S. to gain a defense foothold in Greenland.
Instead, strong alliances and mutual agreements—something that Trump is no fan of—are likely going to be the key to countering the very real threat to the U.S. and its NATO allies.
James Patton Rogers is a historian of technology and war and the executive director of the Brooks Tech Policy Institute at Cornell University (US). Caroline Kennedy Pipe is an expert in Arctic security and professor of war studies at Loughborough University (UK).
Made by History takes readers beyond the headlines with articles written and edited by professional historians. Learn more about Made by History at TIME here. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of TIME editors.