As European leaders and the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky gather in Washington to persuade President Donald Trump not to abandon Ukraine and to secure Western security guarantees for Kyiv, one thing is certain: Vladimir Putin will not abandon his quest to dominate the Black Sea.
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In a sprawling naval exercise, “July Storm,” the Russian navy practiced the very tactics Ukraine used against its Black Sea fleet. Kyiv’s asymmetrical campaign deploying naval drone and missile strikes destroyed or disabled one third of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, broke the blockade of Ukrainian ports, forced most of the Russia fleet to decamp to southern Russia, and allowed Ukraine’s commercial shipping, mostly grain exports, to recover to near pre-war levels.
Kremlin took notes. In the July naval drills, Russia used explosive-laden naval drones to sink targets and practiced anti-submarine warfare, mine-laying, and missile strikes. Putin described the naval exercises as designed to train naval forces in “repelling maritime attacks” and “unconventional operational and tactical missions,” while referring to “experience gained” from battles with Ukraine in the Black Sea.
Given that Ukraine lacks a significant conventional navy, the Russian exercises seem to be aimed at the coming battles beyond Ukraine.
Why the Black Sea matters
Russia has long seen the domination of the Black Sea as necessary for its global ambitions, its great power status, and its identity as a civilizational state. From Peter the Great to Nicholas I, the czars fought wars to gain access to and control the Black Sea. Lenin pushed to secure the Black Sea region during the Russian Civil War. Stalin made the Black Sea Fleet a core element of Soviet military strategy.
Putin sees Russian identity as defined by a linguistic and cultural sphere that extends beyond the formal borders of the Russian Federation, and his denial of Ukrainian nationhood stems from this worldview. His war against Ukraine is tied to his quest to dominate the Black Sea, which offers strategic access and a pathway to project influence beyond the traditional Russian sphere into the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa.
The importance of the Black Sea for Russia increased further after Finland and Sweden joined the NATO in 2023 and 2024, reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank and constraining Russia in the Baltic. Putin had already expanded Russian control of the Black Sea coast by occupying parts of Georgia in 2008, the Crimean peninsula in 2014, and Sevastopol and large parts of Kherson Oblast and Zaporizhzhia Oblast after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Occupying these Black Sea territories has helped Moscow position itself better to challenge European security through both conventional and unconventional ways.
Europe’s Black Sea challenge
European security today is being forged in opposition to Russia. The Black Sea region stands out as a canvas of chokepoints and competing sovereignties, of energy routes and grain corridors, of overlapping jurisdictions and unresolved conflicts. It is the axis along which European security is being tested and it is poised to become a central theater in the unfolding confrontation between Europe and Russia.
The perception of U.S. withdrawal from Europe will likely further embolden Putin to exploit vulnerabilities and test the continent’s resolve. Since the election of President Trump, Europe has built some momentum to bolster its collective defenses and increased commitments to defense spending from two to five percent of GDP.
European leaders have discussed various scenarios for Black Sea security but, in essence, they circle back to a single strategy: keeping the U.S. engaged in Ukraine and the Black Sea region. If Trump does indeed end his confrontation with Russia over Ukraine and the Black Sea and decides against joining a Western security guarantee for Kyiv, Europe faces the grim prospect of facing Russia alone.
In May, the European Union adopted a new Black Sea Strategy, which comes down to establishing a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub tasked with monitoring and providing early warning of emerging threats and malign activities. While it is unclear how such early warnings could translate into action , if it is effectively implemented, the initiative could help constrain Russia’s subversive actions and promote a more coordinated response among E.U. member states.
Turkey controls the Black Sea’s gates—the Bosporus and the Dardanelles—under the Montreux Convention, which governs passages through the Turkish straits in and out of the Black Sea. The West doesn’t have the buy in from Ankara for any expanded Western or NATO presence in the region. Turkey sees it as contravening the Montreux Convention and its own strategic interests. Without Ankara’s support, the European strategy for the Black Sea has little bite.
And the littoral Black Sea states—Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania—are vulnerable to Russian exploitation. Europe also needs to work with NATO to reduce their military, political, and socio-economic vulnerabilities.
Ukraine is the hinge. And Europe needs persistent, long term efforts to help Ukraine strengthen its capacity to preserve its control of its coastline and counterbalance Russia, in partnership with other littoral states. A strong Ukraine—with a robust army and navy—is not only crucial for Ukrainian nationhood and statehood but also for restraining Russia in the Black Sea and preventing future conflicts.
Rebuilding Russia’s Black Sea fleet
In the past decade or so, Russia tried to challenge European security from the Black Sea in its east and the Mediterranean Sea in the south. Kremlin positioned four submarines in the Black Sea and two submarines at a Mediterranean Sea base at Tartus in Syria, where it intervened aggressively to support the Bashar al Assad regime. But the Ukrainian naval successes and the fall of the Assad regime battered Russian maritime power in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In Syria, Moscow is seeking ways to retain part of its Assad-era presence and Damascus is being more receptive.
One of Moscow’s most pressing ambitions is to rebuild its Black Sea Fleet and to adapt to the changing nature of naval warfare. In June, Putin approved a new naval doctrine aimed at restoring Russia’s status as a preeminent naval power. According to Putin’s chief aide, Nikolai Patrushev, “In the coming years, the Black Sea sailors will be further strengthened with the arrival of new frigates, corvettes, aviation, marine robotic complexes.” In his words, the Black Sea Fleet is crucial for containing NATO and countering Western interests in the region. Russia has already started building a naval base in Georgia’s Abkhazia region, which Moscow has occupied since the 2008 war.
Russian influence in the Mediterranean and the future of its naval base in Syria have become uncertain after the fall of Assad. Moscow is keen to return its two submarines from Syria to the Black Sea to reinforce its fleet but they need to cross the Turkish straits. Ankara has closed that possibility as it exercised the rights granted to it by the Montreux Convention and immediately closed its straits to passages of warships and naval vessels after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Turkey is unlikely to open the straits until a comprehensive peace agreement is reached between Ukraine and Russia.
Yet with support from China, in a few years, Moscow could return with a fleet optimized for the Black Sea contest, where harassment and latest threats would keep global commerce anxious, allies divided, and Europe reactive.
Thus, cooperation between Europe, Britain, and Turkey is essential. Turkey opposes an expanded NATO presence in the Black Sea, due to the Montreux Convention constraints, its preference for the regional control of the sea, and its opposition to Russian hegemony. Turkey’s strategic interests align with maintaining a balance of power, supporting Ukrainian capabilities, and counterbalancing Russian hegemony without escalating NATO involvement.
Ukraine, Europe, and the Black Sea
Over the past two decades, as Russia’s zones of occupation and domination in the Black Sea region expanded, its aggression also pushed regional states closer to the West. Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania are NATO members; Ukraine and Georgia are keen to join the alliance. And while Romania and Bulgaria are part of the EU, Ukraine, Georgia, and Turkey aspire to join it.
Russia will try to hinder the integration of these states (apart from Turkey) into Western security and economic structures and compel them to yield to or at least accommodate its demands. To achieve those goals, Moscow is looking at revitalizing its naval power in the Black Sea and consolidating its gains in Ukraine.
In any peace talks, Russia will try to seek demilitarization of Ukraine and severe limitations on its militarization and security partnerships with NATO and Europe, which would render Ukraine perennially vulnerable and endanger European security. A NATO membership for Ukraine is unlikely but the U.S. and Europe should strengthen its military capability to counter Russia in the Black Sea. If Putin fails at the table, Moscow is likely to blame Kyiv for its failures and intensify the war to grab more territory. The Black Sea port of Odessa would be an obvious target.
The outcome of the war in the Black Sea will also redefine Russia’s ambitions toward its near abroad. An emboldened Russia could create a pervasive sense of insecurity from Armenia to Georgia to Kazakhstan to Moldova to the Baltic states.
The way hostilities end in the Black Sea will reshape the regional order and redefine Russia’s future as a global power. To prevent Russian geopolitical revisionism, European powers, Britain, and Turkey—and ideally the U.S–must ensure that Ukraine remains a Black Sea country—maintains control of Odesa and its adjacent coastline, has credible Western security guarantees and strong defense capability. They should also strengthen other Black Sea littoral states and promote greater cooperation amongst them.
The Black Sea will define the future of the European security order for generations to come. Structured security cooperation between the EU, Britain, and Turkey should be the backbone of the order.